Is Pogge a Capability Theorist in Disguise? by Ilse Oosterlaken
Is Pogge a Capability Theorist in Disguise?
A Critical Examination of Thomas Pogge’s Defence
of Rawlsian Resourcism
Ilse Oosterlaken
Accepted: 27 January 2012 /Published online: 22 February 2012
# The Author(s) 2012. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Thomas Pogge answers the question if the capability approach can be justified
with a firm ‘no’. Amongst others, he ridicules capability theorists for demanding compen-
sation for each and every possible natural difference between people, including hair types.
Not only does Pogge, so this paper argues, misconstrue the difference between the capability
approach and Rawlsian resourcism. Even worse: he is actually implicitly relying on the idea
of capabilities in his defence of the latter. According to him the resourcist holds that the
institutional order should not be biased towards the average person or the needs of some.
Yet, as his own case of blind people and traffic lights can illustrate, whether or not this is the
case is impossible to assess without resorting to some concept like people’s capabilities.
Secondly, it is argued that the real issue at stake is not at all the best metric of justice—
primary goods or capabilities—but rather the scope of theories of justice. On the surface the
difference of opinion seems to be how to deal with so-called “personal heterogeneities”, yet
the discussed case of interpersonal differences in metabolism and communal land-use
choices hints at something else; Whereas Pogge insists that questions of justice only concern
the institutional structure of society, many capability theorists support the inclusion of
culture and social practices as possible sources of injustice. Unfortunately Pogge does not
properly acknowledge this, as right from the start of his paper he frames the debate between
both approaches in terms of institutions only.
Keywords Thomas Pogge . Primary goods . Human capabilities . Capability approach .
Rawlsian resourcism
1 Introduction
In 1979 Amartya Sen gave the Tanner Lecture on Human Values, for which he chose the title
“Equality of what?” (Sen 1979). This question, concerning the best metric or evaluative
space in matters of justice and equality, is nowadays still a topic of philosophical debate.
Answers that have been discussed in the literature include utility, preference satisfaction,
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access to advantage, resources, Rawlsian primary goods, and—which Sen himself defends—
human capabilities. This paper is concerned with the latter two. As the basic primary goods
Rawls lists (a) certain rights, liberties, and opportunities; (b) income and wealth and (c) the
social bases of self-respect. He claims that these primary goods are means or “things that every
rational man is presumed to want […] whatever a person’s rational plan of life” (Rawls 1999,
p.54). From the perspective of the capability approach, however, we should take account
“not only of the primary goods the persons respectively hold, but also of the relevant
personal characteristics that govern the conversion of primary good into the person’s
ability to promote her ends. What matters to people is that they are able to achieve actual
functionings, that is the actual living that people manage to achieve” (Sen 1999, p.74).
‘Functionings’ refers to anything a person could do or be, like travelling or being part of a
community. Capabilities are then the corresponding positive or substantive freedoms to
achieve these functionings. A recent addition to this debate is a book edited by Brighouse
and Robeyns (2010), titled Measuring Justice—Primary Goods and Capabilities. This
volume also contains an abridged version of an article that Thomas Pogge already published
in 2002(a) under the title Can the Capability Approach be Justified? In that article—and in
the reprinted book contribution—Pogge answers the question that he poses with a distinct
‘no’ and defends Rawlsian resourcism instead. Amongst others he ridicules capability
theorists for demanding compensation for each and every possible natural difference be-
tween people, including hair types. The question that I will discuss in this paper is whether
Pogge’s rejection of the capability approach is coherent and justified.
The first section will summarize how exactly Pogge understands Rawlsian resourcism,
the capability approach and the differences between them. What I will argue in this essay is
firstly that Pogge misconstrues the difference between the resourcist approach and the
capability approach and is even implicitly relying on the idea of capabilities in his defence
of resourcism. This is being discussed in section two, which will focus on primary goods
versus human capabilities as the metric of justice, using the case of blind people and traffic
lights. Secondly I will argue that, when reading Pogge’s article carefully, it seems that his
apparent rejection of capabilities as the evaluative space for justice is masking something
else. What Pogge, on a more fundamental level, seems to disapprove of is the widening by
many capability theorists of the scope of justice beyond institutional design, to include
things like cultural practices as well. This will be discussed in section three, where I will
discuss the scope of justice, using the case of interpersonal differences in metabolism.
Sections two and three thus address two different topics of disagreement between Pogge
and capability scholars - of which only the second will turn out to be a real topic of
disagreement. The last section will summarize the conclusions.
2 Pogge’s Analysis of the Contrast Between Both Approaches
The existence of immense human diversity is a key concern in the literature on the capability
approach. Because of facts of human diversity, the degree to which resources can be
converted into capabilities differs from person to person. A disabled person, for example,
may need more or different resources to be able to do and be the same things as an able-
bodied person. Hence, capability theorists consider capabilities to be a better ‘space of
equality’ than resources. Pogge (p.32)1 also concludes that the “key theoretical difference”
1 Unless stated otherwise, I will refer to the 2010 abridged reprint of Pogge’s article (Pogge 2010).
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between a capability approach and a resourcist approach is their answer to the question “how
institutional schemes are to respond to natural human diversity” (emphasis is mine). The
“key question” in the debate between both approaches, Pogge said earlier in the same book
chapter (p.18), is the following:
“Should alternative feasible institutional schemes be assessed in terms of their participants’
access to valuable resources or in terms of their participants’ capabilities, that is, access to
valuable functionings?”
Note the centrality of the term ‘institutional schemes’ in both quotes—I will get back to
this in section three.
So what is Pogge’s take on resourcism versus the capability approach in relation to human
diversity? He claims that a sophisticated resourcist approach—like the Rawlsian one—can take
into account many of the facts of human diversity often mentioned by Sen, such as differences
in relational perspectives, variations in social climate and environmental diversities. Variations
in social climate, for example, concern amongst others “the prevalence or absence of crime and
violence […] epidemiology and pollutions […] the nature of community relationships” (Sen
1999, p.70). Pogge (p.22) says that
“our paradigm resourcist Rawls sees such factors as rendering insecure some of the
basic liberties of citizens such as their physical and psychological integrity and their
freedom of movement.”
The “core of the debate between the two approaches” lies, according to Pogge (p.23), rather
in the way both approaches treat pure personal heterogeneities, by which he means natural
individual variations in physical/mental characteristics due to “ordinary genetic variations, self-
caused factors, and differential luck”. Pogge (p.29) thus concludes that if one makes the
resourcist approach as strong as possible, then the class of cases on which both approaches
differ fundamentally is actually quite limited. For argument’s sake I will accept Pogge’s claim
that a sophisticated resourcist can take into account many different facts of human diversity.
Like Pogge, I will thus also focus on cases of pure personal heterogeneities.
It should be noted, however, that Pogge argues that many personal heterogeneities are not
natural at all, but caused by either past or present inequality in resource access under some
institutional order. Such resource deprivation, he says, is the cause of many physical/mental
special needs or disabilities coming into existence. Resourcists, Pogge claims (p.28), have a
more compelling response to such cases than capability theorists:
“Where the latter criticize institutional schemes for their failure to compensate for
special physical and mental frailties, resourcists more powerfully criticize the same
institutional schemes for their failure to compensate for frailties they themselves
produce.”
Thus, he says, “on a resourcist view, the causal origins of special needs and disabilities
are morally significant.”
What is implicitly illustrated in this brief summary of Pogge’s position is that there are at
least two different questions at stake in discussions about distributive justice. One question is
what the right metric or evaluative space of justice is (e.g. resources, Rawlsian primary
goods, preference satisfaction, human capabilities or something else). The other question is
what rules govern a just distribution of whatever is chosen in answer to the first question.
Anderson (2010), who herself defends capabilities as the right metric of justice, gives a
detailed overview of possible answers to this last question. She makes a distinction between
unconstrained procedural rules, constrained procedural rules and distributive pattern rules.
Is Pogge a Capability Theorist in Disguise? 207
Common answers in the last category, for example, are that there should be complete
equality amongst people (egalitarianism), that everybody should have the good in question
up to at least a certain threshold (sufficientarianism), or that the holdings of the worst off
should be maximized (prioritarianism). As both questions present different options that can
be combined, a large number of different theories of justice can thus be constructed.
Rawlsian resourcism, for example, combines a focus on primary good as the metric of
justice with principles of justice that are prioritarian, since Rawls’ difference principle says
that “social and economic inequalities […] are to be to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged members of society” (Rawls 1993, p.6, emphasis is mine). Nussbaum (2006),
like Sen considered to be one of the founders of the capability approach, combines a focus
on capabilities as the metric of justice with sufficientarianism, as she claims that justice
requires everybody to be brought up to at least a threshold level for all the capabilities on her
list. Sen is not defending a particular set of rules concerning the distribution of capabilities.
In discussing what a just distribution is, one may also—as Pogge does—ask what the
cause of an inequality is and distinguish between different causes. One might label this as
the question about the scope of distributive justice. As we already saw, this question is
important for Pogge. This is not surprising, considering that his other work in the area of
global justice is known to emphasize the importance of causal chains (e.g. Pogge 2002b).
His argument is that the global institutional schemes that Western people have created and
uphold—such as the patent system and certain property rules—cause poverty elsewhere. We
are—according to Pogge—harming the global poor in this way. Thus, our obligation to
change their situation of deprivation is not stemming from positive duties of beneficence, but
rather from us violating our negative duties not to harm them. For the purposes of this paper
the important thing to realize is that according to Pogge “on a resourcist view, the causal
origins of special needs and disabilities are morally significant.” He thus construes the
resourcist view not exclusively as a choice for resources or primary goods as the right metric
of justice.
What I will argue in the next section, is that in defending resources as the best metric of
justice, Pogge misconstrues the difference between the resourcist approach and the capability
approach and is moreover implicitly making use of the idea of capabilities in his defence of
resourcism. The example used here is that of blind people and traffic lights, which was
introduced by Pogge himself in the paper under discussion here. In section three I will get
back to causal chains and Pogge’s focus on institutions, using the case of interpersonal
difference in metabolism.
3 The Metric of Justice: The Case of the Blind and Traffic Lights
Capability theorists, says Pogge, “value the goods persons have access to by reference to the
specific needs and endowments of each particular person”, while resourcists are “guided by
some conception of the standard needs and endowments of human beings” (p.23–24). This is
also the distinction between both approaches according to Anderson (2010, p.87). Yet, Pogge
also asserts, the resourcist “must avoid the complaint that this account is modelled mainly on the
needs of some and much less appropriate to the needs of others.” The resourcist metric “must
take account of the full range of diverse human needs and endowments” (p.31, emphasis is
mine). However, as Anderson (2010, p.92) notes, it is hard to see how one can depart from both
standard human needs and the full range of diverse human needs at the same time; as soon as
one opts for the latter, one comes close to taking a capability approach, with its characteristic
emphasis on human diversity. One cannot help but wonder: How is the resourcist able, without
208 I. Oosterlaken
resorting to some concept like capabilities, to determine that some institution providing primary
goods is unbiased towards specific human needs or characteristics?
One of the cases that Pogge himself discusses is that of blind people and traffic lights with
only visible signals. He considers these artefacts to be a part of the institutional order.
According to Pogge (p.31) capability theorists may:
“say to the disabled person: ‘I understand that you have a lesser capacity to convert
resources into valuable functionings. For this reason, we will ensure that you get more
resources than others as compensation for your disability. In doing so, our objective is
that, by converting your larger bundle of resources, you will be able to reach roughly
the same level of capability as the rest of us […]. The resourcist might say instead: ‘I
understand that the present organization of our society is less appropriate to your
mental and physical constitution than to those of most of your fellow citizens. In this
sense, our shared institutional order is not affording you genuinely equal treatment. To
make up for the ways in which we are treating you worse than most others, we propose
to treat you better than them in other respects. For example, to make up for the fact that
traffic instructions are communicated through visible but inaudible signals, we will
provide free guide dogs to the blind’.
In this quote Pogge sketches a distorted picture of the likely response of a capability
theorist and a false contrast between the two approaches. Three points stand out. Firstly, it is
strange that in this case Pogge ascribes a vague and general solution like compensation by
providing more resources to capability theorists. This is surprising, as proponents of the
capability approach are particularly aware of the limitations of merely providing resources.
Without referring to this specific case, Keleher (2004) makes the same point:
“Pogge wrongly commits himself to the problematic position that the only way the
capability theorist can hope to enhance capabilities—regardless of a particular individual’s
situation, is through the distribution of (various quantities and qualities of) resources.
Thus, according to Pogge, the capability theorist, like the resourcist, is concerned only
with institutional distribution of resources. This is a grave error.”
Being concerned about guaranteeing actual capabilities in practice and not in principle, in
the case of the traffic lights capability theorists would opt for a concrete solution that
efficiently and effectively tackles the capability deprivation in question, be it by providing
resources like guide dogs or by institutional re-design in the form of adding audible signals
to the traffic lights.
Secondly, Pogge suggests that capability theorists propose to provide compensation for
inferior physical properties or a lack of internal capacities. However—as Anderson (2010,
p.97) remarks—a capability theorist would not demand compensation for “the bare fact of lacking
certain innate endowments”, as on its own this does not constitute a capability deprivation. The
capability approach is interested in what Nussbaum (2000, p. 84/85) calls “combined capabilities,
which may be defined as internal capabilities combined with suitable external conditions for the
exercise of the functioning.” In other words (Smith and Seward 2009): the ontology of capabilities
is relational, as an individual’s capabilities come about or cease to exist in a constellation of
specific characteristics of these individuals and of those social/physical structures in which they
are embedded. One might try to argue that in the case of disabilities like blindness or not being
able to use one’s legs, the capability of which the person is deprived is not relational, as these
handicaps are purely physical characteristics of a person (an internal ‘incapacity’). Yet this
position is exactly what has been forcefully and quite successfully been challenged by activists
in the area of disability (Terzi 2010)—the degree to which not being able to use one’s leg
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becomes a severe handicap or capability deprivation depends on external states of the world,
like the wheelchair accessibility of our buildings. Pogge (p.30) actually acknowledges this at
one point in his resourcist reply to the case of disability.
Thirdly and most importantly, the resourcist in the quote from Pogge’s paper implicitly
relies on some capability concept. To see that, first let me ask the question what resource is at
stake here. If it is the traffic light itself, as a merely material artefact, one could say to a blind
person: “of course this traffic light has been installed for your convenience as well, you are as
free to take advantage of it as any other person and nobody is keeping you from doing so.”And
that would be the end of the story. Underlying this response is a view of traffic lights as basically
a constellation of wires, nuts and bolts, light bulbs and so on—how could that discriminate
against the disabled or be a case of injustice? There is nothing discriminatory about green lights
per se, just as there is nothing inclusive about audio-signals per se. If instead we want to argue
that something is wrong with this response, that this specific institutional arrangement unfairly
assumes—as Pogge’s resourcist says it does in the quote from p.31—some average person, it
seems that a different conceptualization of the resource in question is needed. One possibility
would be to conceptualize the resource distributed not as ‘traffic lights’ but as ‘safety in traffic.’2
In fact, this move seems not so radical in light of the fact that Pogge himself defends not a
simplistic resourcism, but what he claims to be the most sophisticated form of it: Rawlsian
resourcism. As was mentioned at the start of this article, the first items on Rawls’ list of primary
goods are certain rights, liberties, and opportunities. For blind people freedom of movement
would be restricted in a very practical way if there were only traffic lights with visible signals—
their physical safety would be threatened every time they would try to cross a busy street. Rawls
claims that primary goods are “things that every rational man is presumed to want […] whatever
a person’s rational plan of life” (Rawls 1999, p.54)—arguably this also applies to basic traffic
safety. It can be said to be one of the constitutive elements of true freedom of movement.
However, it should be noted, this choice for ‘safety in traffic’ instead of ‘traffic lights’ as the
good in question is not trivial; Safety in traffic is not ‘out there’ in theworld in the sameway that
traffic lights are, independent fromwho the person participating in traffic is. This safety arises or
fails to arise in an interaction between a specific person—whether blind or not—and her
specific environment. We have thus already come close to the relevant concept of capability,
which is—as noted before—relational in exactly this way; Whether or not someone has the
capability to be safe in traffic depends on the internal capacities of the person (seeing or blind) in
combinationwith the details of design of the external environment, including traffic lights (with
or without audible signals). Now let’s recapitulate:
(1) Pogge considers traffic lights to be part of the basic institutional order, so that
(2) a condition of fairness or treating everybody as equals applies, meaning that
(3) in their design we “must take account of the full range of diverse human needs and
endowments,”
(4) a condition that—considering the fact that some people are born blind-
(5) is, according to Pogge, violated in case of traffic lights with visible signals only, a claim that
2 There is a different way to argue along the same lines as is being done here, but it would require a detour in
philosophy of technology. This alternative argument proposes a move not from traffic lights to safety in traffic
as the good to be distributed, but from seeing traffic lights as mere material artefacts—e.g. a collection of
‘nuts and bolts’ and so on—to proper technical artefacts. Using the account of Houkes and Vermaas (2010)
about the nature of technical artefacts and engineering design, it can be argued that technical artefacts are (1)
per definition designed with the aim of expanding some human capabilities and (2) may indeed discriminate
against non-average users like the disabled—in which case the artefacts will not expand the capabilities of
these users. For more details the reader is referred to Oosterlaken (2012).
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(6) can only be substantiated if we resort to a capability-like concept as the metric of
justice
The upshot is thus the following: Pogge identifies a certain type of traffic lights as a case
of injustice, but how would he be able to determine that this traffic light or any other
institutional design is unjustly biased towards the needs of some, while excluding others,
without resorting to a concept like capability? He cannot. There is nothing about traffic
lights as mere material artefacts in isolation that points in that direction. The problem cannot
be identified without at least implicitly using some concept of a lack of capability or ‘access
to functioning’ for the blind person, resulting from the interplay between specific personal
characteristics and design features of the institutional arrangement in question. Perhaps it
seems possible to leave capabilities out of the story, but this is only because it is a very
simple and intuitively obvious example—surely we don’t need any fancy philosophical
concepts or insights to grasp that a certain type of traffic light by design is not appropriate for
blind people? However, when we have to judge more complex institutional designs or when
a larger range of less salient individual characteristics becomes important, it may no longer
be feasible to make a judgement on the justice or inclusiveness of a design without explicitly
investigating what the implications of different design alternatives are for the capabilities of
different categories of individuals.3
4 The Scope of Justice: The Case of Metabolism
The previous section made a contribution to a specific existing debate amongst political
philosophers on the best ‘metric of justice.’ Pogge and capability scholars, so I argued,
actually do not deeply disagree on the question of the best metric of justice—access to
resources or access to functionings (that is, capabilities). Using Pogge’s own example of
traffic lights, I showed that Pogge has to resort—even if only implicitly—to something like
capabilities in order to identify the injustice inherent to some institutional designs. However,
on carefully reading Pogge’s paper a second topic of apparent disagreement between Pogge
and some or possibly many capability theorists emerges—namely on the importance of
causal chains and on the scope of theories of justice. This difference of opinion seems to be
more fundamental to me than the one on the best metric of justice.
To clearly bring out this second disagreement, let’s take another look at pure or natural
personal heterogeneities, according to Pogge at the “core of the debate between the two
approaches.” Pogge (§2.2) is under the impression that the capability theorist—unlike the
resourcist—prescribes compensation for each and every possible natural difference between
people, ranging from differences in metabolism to differences in hair type, for which the
different options all need to be fully ranked from the most to the least desirable in order to
make decisions about compensation. This is, as Keleher (2004) and Anderson (2010) note,
not true. In reality, most capability theorists tend—like resourcists—to care about only some
but not all differences. Both approaches diverge, however, in how they determine when a
personal heterogeneity is a concern of justice. The case of differences in metabolism
between people can illustrate this. Unlike blindness, Pogge (p.48–49) seems to consider a
high metabolism as irrelevant in matters of justice, while Sen (e.g. 1984, p.320) has
repeatedly mentioned interpersonal metabolism differences as one example that can illustrate
3 In her chapter on primary goods versus capabilities in the case of disability Terzi (2010) makes the same
point as I do—using a related, but somewhat different and non-technical case—and the interested reader is
referred to her more extensive treatment of the issue.
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why human capabilities would be a better metric of justice than resources. Now assume that
the metabolism of one person is such that 8 h of work a day would feed him and of another
person is such that 4 h of work would feed him. This, says Pogge,4 does not mean that there
is any demand of justice that both people work 6 h per day and split the production such that
both people will be fed adequately (and thus maintain the capabilities for which being
adequately nourished is a pre-condition). In other words, we do not—according to the
resourcist—need to compensate the person with a higher metabolism for his natural disad-
vantage. But now take the following example: a community has to decide between two crops
that they can grow on their communal land. Crop A is highly nutritious, but does not taste
that good, while crop B has low nutritious value, but is very delicious. If crop Awere chosen
by the community, the person with the high metabolism would also be adequately fed by his
equal share of the harvest. If crop B is chosen, he will be undernourished if he works as hard
in the field as everybody else. In response to this example, Pogge admits that in that case
metabolism would indeed become relevant, just like blindness in the case of traffic lights,
because the design of the institutional order would be such that it “is modelled mainly on the
needs of some and much less appropriate to the needs of others.” 5
So for Pogge it is not the specific heterogeneity as such that is decisive, but if and how it is
somehow implied in a causal chain including institutions. For different reasons the capability
theorist is also not per definition committed to any interpersonal difference being salient from
the perspective of justice. From the perspective of the capability approach innate endowments
only matter insofar as they are one of the constitutive components of a valuable human
capability—the other components arising, as explained in the previous section, from the
person’s environment. We should thus also ask, as Anderson (2010, p.94/95) notes, which
specific capabilities are valuable, are subject of demands of justice, and what rules of distributive
justice apply. Both Nussbaum and Anderson, the latter explains, propose a sufficientarian
standard of justice; For Anderson, everybody should have those capabilities that are needed to
have an equal standing as a citizen to a sufficient level, for Nussbaum we all have a right to a
sufficient level of those capabilities on her famous list of ten capabilities, which—she claims—
are necessary for a dignified and truly human life. Arguably, undernourishment would lead to
capabilities falling below those thresholds, but once that level is reached the sufficientarian
capability theorist may find differences in metabolism irrelevant.
To summarize, the case of metabolism is illustrative of the following. When we ask if certain
personal heterogeneities are somehow relevant for distributive justice, Pogge and capability
theorists like Nussbaum and Anderson go about differently in answering the question. Pogge
will first and foremost want to know whether the potential injustice involves some institution(s)
being biased towards the average person, which would mean an unequal treatment of persons
deviating from that average. As I have argued in section two, such a bias cannot be determined
without resorting to some notion like human capabilities. Thus a necessary condition for
something being a case of injustice is—according to Pogge—that it involves some biased
institutional arrangement, but—so I argued—a capability-like concept is needed to determine
that this bias indeed exists. When asked if certain personal heterogeneities are relevant for
distributive justice, capability scholars like Nussbaum and Anderson will primarily want to
know if there is any human capability at stake that is relevant for respectively human dignity or
democratic standing and if so, to what degree person(s) with the relevant personal characteristics
fall short of having the capability. What capability scholars like Nussbaum are less concerned
4 Personal communication with Thomas Pogge on May 18th 2010.
5 Personal communication with Thomas Pogge on May 18th 2010.
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with, is whether or not the capability deprivation in question is a consequence of the institutional
order not properly responding to personal heterogeneities, or rather of cultural practices.
It is thus a pity that Pogge—as I noted in section one—immediately frames the debate
between capability theorists and resourcists in terms of the assessment of institutional schemes.
This is hardly surprising, as he is a Rawlsian resourcist. And it is not without meaning that
Rawls (1971) begins his Theory of Justice with the memorable sentence “Justice is the first
virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought” (emphasis is mine). It is exactly
this point that has recently been challenged forcefully by Sen (2009), who argues that our
philosophical debates are too much preoccupied with ‘just institutions’, while we should rather
be discussing ‘just societies’. He defends a non-ideal or non-transcendental idea of justice, to
which a comparative approach of possible states of the world—using amongst others the
capability metric—is central. And these capabilities are brought about not only by the right
institutions, but also—says Sen—by means of culture, social practices and individual people’s
behaviour. As Sen puts it in the preface of The Idea of Justice (2009, p.x):
“The presence of remedial injusticemaywell be connectedwith behavioural transgressions
rather than institutional shortcomings. [..] Justice is ultimately connected with the way
people’s lives go, and not merely with the nature of institutions surrounding them.”
Attention for culture and social practices is also prevalent in other literature on the
capability approach (e.g. Nussbaum 2000). It seems that many capability theorists—in line
with Sen—hold it to be one of the advantages of the capability approach over a resourcist
approach that it is able to reveal some of the consequences of culture and social practices as
being cases of injustice. For example, in her chapter on gender in the book Measuring
Justice—Primary Goods versus Capabilities Robeyns (2010, p.227) writes:
“[Rawls’] Justice as fairness postulates that the subject of justice is the basic structure
of society, that is the totality of social institutions. For the capability approach, justice
is everywhere. For example, the quality of life of individuals in terms of their
capability sets is profoundly affected by the behaviour of other family members and
indeed behaviour of people outside the family. Capability theorists argue that the
injustices that such behaviour can generate need to be part of a theory of justice, and
not relegated to moral theory”
Pogge and these prominent capability scholars thus give different answers to the question of
the scope of justice. But as mentioned before, there is no logical necessity to combine a choice
for capabilities as the metric of justice with a widening of the scope of justice beyond
institutions. Different combinations of answers to the questions of the metric, scope and
distributive rule of justice are possible. And each of these questions deserves attention in its
own right. For example, Broome (2010) has argued that Sen is stretching the scope of justice too
much: “Sen is looking for particular ways to make the world better. Not all those ways
necessarily make it more just.” Unfortunately, this question cannot be properly discussed, let
alone settled, within the limitations of this paper. The main point being made here is that this
topic of disagreement between Pogge and capability scholars is not always properly recognized
and deserves more attention.
5 Conclusion
Whether justice is the virtue of institutions only, or whether for example cultural practices
may also give rise to instances of injustice is a question which deserves further attention
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from both Pogge and capability scholars. Pogge, however, does not even seem to recognize the
question of the scope of justice as a point of contention between him and somemain proponents
of the capability approach. The initial framing in his paper about capabilities versus resources as
the metric of justice simply assumes that all discussants are concerned with just institutions
only. However, as was explained, the questions about the metric and the distributive principles/
scope of justice should not be confused. This, of course, also means that endorsing capabilities
as the best metric of justice does not automatically commit one to also acknowledging
capability deprivations caused by cultural practices as cases of injustice;We can easily conceive
of a variety of the capability approach that merely defends a choice for capabilities instead of
primary goods as the best metric to compare possible institutions only.
So let’s assume—for the sake of argument—that justice indeed only concerns the institu-
tional structure of society. In this way we enter the discussion on Pogge’s terms, in order to get
to the heart of a major flaw in Pogge’s argument. Pogge holds that—according to resourcism—
the design of institutions should be “guided by some conception of the standard needs and
endowments of human beings”, but without being biased against some people. What was
argued in section two is that without looking at capability levels it is hard if not impossible to tell
whether or not institutions are indeed unbiased. Thus Pogge implicitly has to rely on the concept
of human capabilities and seems to be a capability theorist in disguise.
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